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I.

INTRODUCTION

In its 1988 session, the Florida Legislature passed Florida's first
equitable distribution statute.1 The statute was substantially the work

1. FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (1989). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, in addition to all other [equitable
remedies] . . . the court shall set apart to each spouse that spouse's nonmarital

assets and liabilities and shall distribute between the parties the marital assets
and liabilities in such proportions as are equitable, after considering all relevant
factors, including:.
(a) The contribution to the marriage by each spouse, including contributions to
the care and education of the children and services as homemaker.
(b) The economic circumstances of the parties.
(c) The duration of the marriage.
(d) Any interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities of either
party.
(e) The contribution of one spouse to the personal career or educational opportunity of the other spouse.
(f) The desirability of retaining any asset, including an interest in a business,
corporation, or professional practice, intact and free from any claim or interference
by the other party.
(g) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement, and production of income or the improvement of, or the incurring of liabilities to, both the
marital assets and the nonmarital assets of the parties.
(h) Any other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties ....
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Marital assets and liabilities" include:
1. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually
by either spouse or jointly by them;
2. The .. .appreciation [in value] of nonmarital assets resulting from [any
form of marital] contribution ...

3. Interspousal gifts... ;
4. All vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the
marriage in retirement, pension, profit sharing, annuity, deferred compensation,
and insurance plans and programs; and
5. All real property held ... as tenants by the entireties, whether acquired
prior to or during the marriage, shall be presumed to be a marital asset ....
(b) "Nonmarital assets and liabilities" include:
1. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred by either party prior to the marriage
and assets acquired and liabilities incurred in exchange for such assets and liabilities
[whether prior to or during the marriage];
2. Assets acquired separately by either party by noninterspousal gift, bequest,
devise, or descent and assets acquired in exchange for such assets [whether prior
to or during the marriage];
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product of the Florida Supreme Court Matrimonial Commission
created in 1982 and chaired by Justice Overton.2 While the statute
primarily codified existing Florida case law,3 it also significantly advanced the law in several respects.
First, the statute mandates an equitable distribution in all dissolution actions. 4 Second, it adds two equitable factors for determining
each spouse's contribution to the accumulation of the marital estate:
(i) interruption of a career or education and (ii) each spouse's contri-

3. All income derived from nonmarital assets during the marriage unless the
income was treated, used or relied upon by the parties as a martial asset; and
4. Assets and liabilities excluded from marital assets and liabilities by valid
written agreement... and assets acquired and liabilities incurred in exchange for
such assets and liabilities ....
(5) All assets acquired and liabilities incurred by either spouse subsequent to
the date of the marriage and not specifically established as nonmarital assets or
liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities.
(6) The court may provide for equitable distribution of the marital assets and
liabilities without regard to alimony for either party. After the determination of
an equitable distribution of the marital assets and liabilities, the court shall consider
whether a judgment for alimony shall be made.
(7)... [The court may... order... [the equitable distribution to be paid]
in a lump sum or in installments... [if the equities of the case warrant such a
judgment] (emphasis added).
2. Personal conversations with members of the 1982 Matrimonial Law Commission (Apr.
1988). The legislature made several changes to the Matrimonial Law Commission's final draft
that are beyond the scope of this article.
3. See Equitable DistributionBill Approved by Legislature, Fla. B. News, June 15, 1988,
at 4 (interviewing Maurice Kutner, Chairman of the Florida Bar's Family Law Section) [hereinafter Equitable Distribution];see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980)
(noting that FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1989), Florida's alimony statute, allows a judge to award lump
sum alimony to assure equitable distribution of property acquired during marriage). Compare
FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (1989) with Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1197; Sanders v. Sanders, 492 So.
2d 705 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986); Allison v. Allison, 491 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986); Rico
v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986); Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So. 2d 1265 (4th
D.C.A.), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1986); Wynn v. Wynn, 478 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1985); Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631 (4th D.C.A. 1985), review denied, 492 So.
2d 1336 (Fla. 1986); Berger v. Berger, 464 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985); Dewberry v.
Dewberry, 455 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984); DiPrima v. DiPrima, 435 So. 2d 876 (5th
D.C.A. 1983), pet. for review denied, 447 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1984); Vawter v. Vawter, 419 So. 2d
747 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982); Bullard v. Bullard, 385 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980); Brown
v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (1st D.C.A. 1974), cert. dismissed, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1975).
4. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1) (1989). The legislative imprimatur may increase the stature of
equitable distribution in the judicial community. Consequently, courts may be more likely to
grant an equitable distribution in all marriages regardless of duration. But cf. Livnat v. Livnat,
472 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985) (equitable distribution of $38,000 not justified in six-month
marriage). Similarly, the equitable distribution statute may promote uniformity. See Equitable
Distribution,supra note 3.
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bution toward producing marital assets and incurring or reducing marital liabilities. 5 Third, the statute eliminates reference to adultery,
removing it as a factor for a court to consider in the equitable distribution of the marital property.6 Fourth, the statute requires courts
to equitably distribute marital property between the spouses before

awarding alimony. 7 Courts also may equitably distribute the marital

property without regard to alimonyA Finally, the statute defines "marital assets" and "nonmarital assets." 9

5. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(d), (g) (1989). Courts should consider these two factors together
because they represent interrelated marital roles.
6. However, courts can still consider adultery as a "factor necessary to do equity and
justice" under the statute. Id. § 61.075(h). This approach is consistent with case law interpreting
the alimony statute as allowing courts to consider the adultery of the spouse seeking an equitable
distribution. See Noah v. Noah, 491 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1986) (courts may consider adultery, but
adultery may not be the basis of an alimony award unless the adultery translated into greater
financial need for the faithful spouse). In drafting the equitable distribution statute, the legislature incorporated three criteria from FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1989), Florida's alimony statute, see
infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text, but did not incorporate the adultery criterion. This
omission implies the Florida Legislature rejected adultery as a factor relevant to property
distribution.
Equitably distributing marital assets without considering adultery, or any form of fault, is
consistent with the theory behind equitable distribution which directs attention to economic,
not emotional, issues. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d
712 (1985). Courts should consider fault only if the spouse seeking the admission of the fault
evidence can demonstrate clearly and convincingly that fault has impacted negatively on the
economic condition of the marital estate. For example, fault is relevant to property distribution
when one spouse has expended marital assets on a drug addiction.
7.

FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (1989).

8. Id. Permitting courts to make an equitable distribution without considering the amount
of alimony awarded implies that the legislature accepts that courts may use equitable distribution
and alimony to effect different goals. Courts may use equitable distribution to distribute to each
spouse the marital assets that he or she has earned; on the other hand, courts may use alimony
to provide for an individual spouse's needs. The statutory authorization for both equitable
distribution and alimony is consistent with the statutory requirement that courts consider
whether an alimony award is appropriate only after first making an equitable distribution.
Presumably, the statute authorizes rather than requires courts to consider equitable distribution
and alimony as two separate remedies, part of an overall scheme. Cf. Canakaris v. Canakaris,
382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (courts may award lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution). Thus, equity may dictate that the remedies serve overlapping functions. See infra notes
167-206 and accompanying text.
9. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3) (1989). Marital assets are all assets produced by the efforts of
either spouse during the marriage. Id. § 61.075(3)(a). The statutory illustrations of marital assets
include property that Florida courts previously have rejected as marital assets, e.g., nonvested
benefits. Compare id. § 61.075(3)(9) with Summers v. Summers, 491 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1986) (nonvested pension benefits not subject to equitable distribution). Nonmarital assets generally include assets acquired by a spouse prior to marriage as a result of a noninterspousal
gift or as income derived from nomnarital assets. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3)(b) '1989).
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Despite the statute's significant advances, it does not define "equitable distribution." The statute leaves this definition to the trial judges'
discretion. But as appellate courts can overturn an equitable distribution award only in the rare instance when a trial court has abused its
discretion, 10 the statute gives trial courts broad discretion in determining the amount of an equitable distribution award. Apparently, the
Florida Legislature has sacrificed uniformity in the interest of allowing
trial courts to fashion individualized equitable results. Unfortunately,
prior to the statute's adoption, trial courts wielded their discretion in
a gender-biased fashion."' Courts typically awarded three-fourths of
the marital assets to the husband while awarding the wife about a
fourth of the marital assets.Y If the goal of the equitable distribution
statute is to provide equal treatment for each spouse, the high cost
of judicial discretion is unjustified.
Equitable distribution requires the court to distribute marital property upon divorce based upon a presumption that marriage is a partnership. 13 Partnership implies that both spouses contributed to the accumulation of marital property either by generating income or by
providing the family with services such as homemaking or childrearing.
Contributions by each spouse create interests in the marital property
upon dissolution regardless of which spouse holds legal title to the
4

property.1

The legislature should amend the equitable distribution statute to
provide a presumption that courts divide marital property equally in
dissolution actions. This presumption would prevent trial courts from
using their discretion to undervalue wives' contributions. Other common law jurisdictions have imposed such a presumption by statute. 5

10. See Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1985).
11. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
13. See L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §§ 1.01-.04 (1983); Oldham,
Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAm. L. 263, 266 (1983-84). Statutory
variations are numerous. Some statutes have detailed criteria for courts to consider while other
statutes simply require an equitable distribution and leave the criteria to the trial court's
discretion. L. GOLDEN, supra, at § 1.01. Other states have a judicial or statutory presumption
in favor of an equal division. Id. § 8.05.
14. Some commentators have noted that, although courts analogize marriage to a partnership, most courts do not intend to imply that a homemaker is an equal partner because the
courts usually award the homemaker a disproportionately small amount of the marital assets.
See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 98-100 (1983).

15. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)
(1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(f) (1987); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-32(a) (1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.255 (1981).
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Also, two Florida District Courts of Appeal have held that Florida
courts should use equal division as a starting point for the division of
marital property. 16 The presumption derives from the commonly held
conception that marriage is a partnership in which both partners own
assets equally.'1 Fairness requires that a court consider, upon dissolution, the sacrifice of a spouse who subordinates his or her earning
potential for the family.
The presumption of equal division of assets should be rebuttable.
Courts need the flexibility of a rebuttable presumption to achieve the

16. See Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989); Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d
791 (4th D.C.A. 1988), review dismissed, 542 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1989); Ente v. Ente, 442 So. 2d
232 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981).
17. Many couples adopt, either implicitly or explicitly, the philosophy of "what's mine is

yours." See L.

WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 336 (1985) (couples

married longer than 18 years almost unanimously agreed with the following statement: "I assumed we would share all the property . . . we would acquire."); see also Foster, Divorce
Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.D.L. REV. 572, 591 (1973) ("[M]odern marriage is a partnership of co-equals. The family assets accumulated during the marital partnership and attributable
to its functioning and division of labor ordinarily should be equally divided upon divorce .... );
Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV.
165, 177 (1976) ("[A] 50-50 starting point reflects the basic partnership assumption of equality,
but allows other relevant considerations... to influence an unequal division."); Prager, Sharing
Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) (sharing
principles reflect commonly held expectations).
Five common law jurisdictions statutorily impose the partnership analogy by requiring a
presumption of an equal division of marital property. See supra note 12. Courts also have
adopted this conception of marriage. See, e.g., McCormack v. McCormack, 9 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2052 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982) ("[S]haring theories should prevail because they
reflect and reinforce commonly held expectations of sharing which grow out of fundamental
").
characteristics of marriage . .
By varying the terms of an express or implied contract, courts ignore the wife's reliance on
her husband's promise to observe the agreement. If courts ignore her reliance interest, she
suffers uncompensated damages. See L. WEITZMAN, supra, at xiii.
Disagreement exists over what the concept of partnership means and how it should be
applied. See generally Oldham, supra note 13, at 266-69 (partnership marriages are those of
long duration or those that produce children). Some commentators argue that women will eventually acquire an economic status equal to men, and therefore the use of equitable distribution
to rectify disparate economic futures is inappropriate. Some further argue that partnership is
inimical to individual economic responsibility. See Glendon, Is There a Future for Separate
Property?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 315, 318-19 (1974); Powell, Community Property - A Critique of Its
Regulation of Intra-FamilyRelations, 11 WASH. L. REV. 12, 15-16 (1936). In contrast, another
commentator argues that a presumption of greater than an equal division is necessary to compensate women for occupying historically uncompensated roles in a marriage. See Stark, Burning
Down the House: Toward a Theory of More EquitableDistribution,40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1173,
1179 (1988).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss5/2

6

Sessums:
What are
Wives' Contributions
Worth Upon Divorce?: Toward Fully I
UPON DIVORCE
EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION

fairness that a strict rule would prevent in unique situations. A rebuttable presumption of equal division would require a litigant seeking
greater than half of the marital assets to demonstrate a disproportionan alternative agreement,1 9 or a justified need for
ate contribution,",
20
such an award.
A presumption of equal division of marital property would promote
the concept of marriage as a partnership rather than the coupling of
two individuals pursuing separate goals. 21 The presumption would recognize the importance of wives' contributions to the family.2 Because

18. To prevent courts from employing evidence in an arbitrary fashion, the statute should
require clear and convincing evidence that the other spouse wholly failed to contribute anything
to the marriage to rebut the presumption of equal contribution. Limiting disproportionately
unequal distributions to the extraordinary case prevents the type of subjective decision that
usually favors the husband. As Judge Stone pointed out in his dissent in Beasley v. Beasley,
508 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987), quantifying and qualifying contributions is an impossible
task. Courts may grant a disproportionately large share of the marital assets to the husband
because, rather than attempt to quantify the traditional wife's intangible contributions, courts
assume that these intangible contributions are less valuable than the husband's production of
income. Judge Stone argues that courts should not award one spouse a larger equitable distribution merely because the spouse may have "contributed" more to the marriage in one form or
another. Id. at 25.
The presumption of equal division also makes it more difficult for one spouse to use equitable
distribution to punish the other spouse. The law should not allow an individual who is married
for a significant period of time to come into court and denigrate the contributions of his or her
former spouse. Such recriminations are too self-serving to merit serious consideration.
19. Cf. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (widow attempted to gain
more than half of her deceased husband's estate by invalidating their antenuptial agreement).
20. A litigant could show a justification for an unequal division when extenuating economic
circumstances exist. For example, awarding the primary physical residence of the child to the
wife results in the court awarding the marital home to one spouse although the home may
account for more than 50% of the marital assets. See infra text accompanying notes 187-92.
21. The tendency to perceive the couple as two unconnected individuals is evident in one
court's remarks:
The parties, because of their education, training and personalities, or because of
the lack of those factors, do not come into the partnership with equal abilities or
assets. Merely because [husband and wife] share part of their life together does
not of itself require that they leave the partnership with equal assets or liabilities,
but only [requires] that their contributions to the marriage receive equitable recognition and award.
Dewberry v. Dewberry, 455 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
Families form the basis of human society, and courts should foster that role. The state should
encourage marriage by adopting laws making it a desirable institution for both spouses. See
Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 186 (1939).
Fostering the institution of marriage is consistent with the goals of Chapter 61. See FLA. STAT.

§ 61.001(1)-(2) (1984).
22. Some commentators mistakenly describe contributions such as homemaking as
noneconomic contributions. See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DohEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 603 (1988). Such contributions are marketable services. A court could attach
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contributions benefit, families wives should not be punished by receiving less than half of the marital property upon divorce soley because
they rendered their contributions outside the marketplace.
This article proposes that Florida's equitable distribution statute
be amended to provide for a statutory presumption of equal distribution. First, the article will examine the economic differences between
wives and husbands which justify both equal and unequal distributions
of marital property. Next, it will discuss the historical development
of equitable distribution and alimony. Finally, it will examine the
evolution of equitable distribution in Florida.
II.

ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

A. Wives' Economic Dependency
Despite a marked shift in societal and judicial attitudes towards
marital roles, the norm persists that wives are economically dependent
on their husbands.2 Many judicial decisions reflect the shift in societal
attitudes. Some courts view both spouses as equal partners, implying
equal rights, duties, and obligations to contribute to the marriage.24
For many wives, however, the notion of postdivorce equality implicit
in the prevailing philosophy often fails in economic reality. 25
an economic value to the homemaking services by determining their replacement cost to the
husband. Moreover, the wife suffers an opportunity cost in rendering such services. See generally
Knight & Elser, Critical FactorsWhich Influence EquitableDistributionAward, 55 FLA. B.J.
581, 583-84 (1981).
23. The cause of wives' dependency historically has been childrearing. Changing perceptions
over the last 100 years about fertility, contraception, and abortion have liberated women to a
limited extent. V. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX 342 (1973). The United States Supreme

Court has reflected this shift in perceptions in such monumental decisions as Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
24. Professor Weyrauch summarized the national trend. He noted that in the United States the
incidents of marriage, whether formal or informal, increasingly are governed by conceptions of
equality of the spouses. Professor Weyrauch traced this trend to several sources: freedom of contract, constitutional ideals of equality, and respect for individual privacy and autonomy. Weyrauch,
Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415, 418 (1980). Another observer traced the trend
solely to the women's liberation movement, whose manifestations can be found in Supreme
Court decisions such as Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which invalidated an Alabama law
permitting alimony only to wives; the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act; and the increasing
number of women working during marriage. See Note, PropertyDivision and Alimony Awards:
A Survey of Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 415, 415 n.7
(1981). Because freedom of contract and individual autonomy are derived from equality, equality
is probably the overarching consideration.
25. Equality, in the sense of equality of opportunity, is a laudable goal. But in ridding
society of what the Supreme Court has termed "archaic and overbroad generalizations," see,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975), the Court should not overlook in its equal
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Usually, the wife, not the husband, seeks an equitable distribution
upon divorce.2 Wives generally are "secondary wage earners" because
they earn less2 than their husbands, or they are "nonwage-earning
spouses" because they do not work outside the home. Furthermore,

protection decisions the economic differences created by traditional roles. An equitable distribution law that seeks to achieve equality should accommodate this wealth discrepancy. See Kuzer,
Law and the Houseufe: Property, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1975).
In this manner, the spouse assuming the financially dependent role in the marriage can obtain
a fair share of the marital assets.
26. Often, but not invariably, the wife is the homemaker. The husband traditionally assumes
the "breadwinner" role. While traditional roles continue to be the norm, they are not universal,
and consequently the gender-specific terms used in this article may inaccurately depict some
marriages. In the instance of a role reversal, switching the terms "husband" and 'Wife" will
make this article applicable. The author does not advocate the norm. Rather, the author wishes
the article's solutions to benefit any individual who has assumed an economically disadvantageous
role to benefit his or her family or who has the most pressing economic need. See Dellavecchia
v. Dellavecchia, 547 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1989) (trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding essentially all of marital assets to husband considering husband's permanent disability).
27. Women working full-time year-round still earn approximately 35% less than similarly
employed men. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, 20 MONEY INCOME
AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1987, at 7

(1987). Women workers with four or more years of college earn about the same amount as men
with an eighth-grade education. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 20 FACTS OF
WOMEN WORKERS 2 (1980). After women reach age 34 their wages decline, while a man's
income does not peak until he reaches his mid-fifties. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF

12 (1979).
The earnings gap has not prevented women from entering the labor force. By 1980 slightly
more than half of all married women worked outside the home. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 382 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES TABLE
LABOR, 19 EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN

653 (107th ed. 1987); see also Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common

Law Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1268, 1309-10 (1981) (increase in number of working
women reinforces concept that marriage is a partnership).
The influx of women into the labor force probably does not correlate to an increase in their
economic independence. Most women still work in low-paying jobs. For example, 93% of all
secretaries, 99% of all nurses, and 75% of all clerks are women. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 34 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 22 (1987). Correspondingly, only
28% of all managers are women. Id.
The fact that working wives occupy primarily menial jobs may be a function, not of invidious
sex discrimination, but of economics. Employers simply may pay women less due to economic
factors that serve to deflate their marketability: long absences from the work force to raise
children; lack of marketable skills; and inability, due to domestic obligations, to devote the time
necessary to build a career. A homemaker's earning capacity depends, in part, on the length
of time she has placed her family at a higher priority than her career or education. See generally
Mincer & Polachek, Women's EarningsReexamined, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 103 (1978) (housewife's earning capacity atrophies by 1.5% for each year successively out of the labor force).
Homemakers deserve to be compensated for this permanent economic loss.
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wives usually assume the role of homemaker, full-time or part-time. 2 8
Because husbands are typically the primary wage earners, the bulk
of the marital assets at the time of dissolution may be titled in the
husband's name. This economic reality is problematic for wives because

Florida courts still utilize title as the starting point in equitably distributing marital property.2 The notion of postdivorce equality thus
fails to recognize wives' persistent economic dependency in today's
society.
B.

DisparateEarningAbilities Between
Men and Women After Divorce

Traditional roles create economic disparity between the husband
and wife when their marriage ends.30 Upon divorce the husband usually
receives the bulk of the marital assets or at least the bulk of the
income-producing assets.3 1 In Florida the husband typically retains
three-fourths of the marital property while the wife retains the remain32
ing one-fourth.
28. One commentator likened these demands to having three jobs. See Kulzer, supra note
25, at 13-14 (1975). One study found that working wives without children spent, on the average,
3.5 hours per day doing housework. Husbands did housework only 1.5 hours per day. Moreover,
the wife spent more time doing housework if she had children or if she was not employed outside
the home. See C. DELGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 431-32 (1980).
29. See Kulzer, supra note 25, at 13-14. Florida's approach is consistent with that of other
common law jurisdictions. Only in community property states does marriage itself create property
rights in the wife. See H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 590-91.
30. Approximately half of all marriages end in divorce. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 17,
at ix. In total dollars, the amount of money transferred upon divorce equals the amount of
money transferred upon death. Id. at xvii (citing Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution
of Marriage and Informal Unions, in THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1981 (1982)).
If the breadwinner predeceases the homemaker, Florida's intestacy statute entitles the homemaker to half of the probate estate plus $20,000. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101-.102 (1989). If the
breadwinner predeceases the homemaker but dies testate, the homemaker is entitled to at least
a third of the breadwinner's estate. See id. §§ 732.201, .207. In a divorce the homemaker is
not entitled to any set percentage of the marital estate. Instead, the trial court has the discretion
to make a property distribution to the homemaker, or an alimony award, or both. See id. §§
61.075, .08.
While the trial court's discretion in dissolution actions allows the court to award a homemaker
an amount exceeding the amount the homemaker would have received if the breadwinner had
died, Florida case law indicates that homemakers receive, on the average, 25% of the marital
estate upon divorce, see infra note 104, and a one-third minimum share at the death of their
testate husbands. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201, .207 (1989).
31. See Frumkes & Langan, Equitable Is Not Necessarily Equal, 12 FAM. L. CoMM. 12,
13 (Nov. 1986).
32. See infra note 104 (analyzing Florida appellate decisions from 1980 through 1986).
Florida is not alone in its lack of evenhandedness. A New Jersey Supreme Court task force
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Because wives increasingly are expected to be self-reliant after
divorce,33 courts award alimony, if at all, for short periods and in small
amounts.s Alimony awards fail to remedy husbands' and wives' postdivorce economic disparities as readily as property awards. Courts'
emphases on wives' self-sufficiency often overlook economic realities
because alimony, even when coupled with the wives' earning abilities,
often is insufficient to permit wives to attain economic independence.
Even generous alimony awards provide wives only precarious protection, especially after long marriages, because, in Florida, alimony terminates at the husband's death.36 Using equitable distribution, when
concluded that equitable distribution resulted in wives receiving 35-40% of the marital property.
See N.J. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE FIRST
YEAR 8 (1984) [hereinafter WOMEN IN COURTS]. One report found similar inequitable distributions in New York. See L. WEITzMAN, supra note 17, at 106-08 (citing Cohen & Hillman,
Analysis of Seventy Select Decisions After Trial Under New York State's Equitable Distribution
Law, from January 1981 through October 1984, at 5 (Nov. 1, 1984) (unpublished manuscript)).
Equitable distribution may be a re-creation of the traditional dower interest.
33. See generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 32-36 (5 out of 6 divorced women did
not receive alimony awards in 1978); see also Kulzer, supra note 25, at 20-23 (trend toward
abandoning stereotypical roles for women has been accompanied by the view that women should
become self-supporting, even in an unequal world).
34. See, e.g., Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAm. L.Q. 351, 352 (1987);
McClindon, Separate but Unequal:The Economic Disasterof Divorcefor Women and Children,
21 F.A. L.Q. 351, 352 (1982). One study in Los Angeles County found that the percentage of
permanent alimony awards dropped from 62% to 32% of total alimony awards between the years
1968 and 1972. In 1977 two-thirds of the alimony awards were rehabilitative alimony awards
with an average duration of two years. Moreover, the awards averaged only $210 a month in
1984 dollars. See L. WEITZAIAN, supra note 17, at 164-71.
Nationally, only 15% of the 17 million divorced or separated women in the United States
received alimony awards in 1981. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMIERCE,
SERIES P-23, No. 124, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981, at 2 (1983) [hereinafter CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY]. Moreover, only 43.5% of those awarded alimony received the full
amount. Of the remaining women, 23.9% received partial payment and 32.6% received nothing.
Id. Divorced husbands paid, on the average, $3000 per year. Adjusting for inflation reveals
that alimony received dropped in real dollars by 25% between the years 1978 and 1981. Id.
35. This problem is especially true for women with childrearing responsibilities and for
those who have been out of the labor force for an extended period of time. See generally L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 184-214 (16% of wives with children and 50% of those married
15 years or longer awarded alimony). Divorced women often have childrearing responsibilities
since courts award the wife custody of the children in 90% of dissolution actions. Id. at 232.
Rehabilitative alimony often forces divorced women to "sell themselves short" by foregoing job
training when re-entering the job market. They must take menial jobs to obtain self-sufficiency
immediately. Research shows that if divorced women were initially to receive a high support
award and then to obtain job training, they would be more self sufficient than if they only
received rehabilitative alimony. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social andEconomic
Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181,
1230-32 (1981).
36. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

11

Florida
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 2
FLORIDA
REVIEW

[Vol. 41

sufficient property is available,3 7 as an alternative to alimony awards
would remedy the inadequacies of alimony awards.
Child support awards suffer from the same defects inherent in
alimony awards. In addition, child support is hard to collect and is
often awarded in nominal amounts.M Wives must make up any shortfall
from funds necessary for their own support.
Women face economic hardships after divorce.39 A New Jersey
Supreme Court task force summarized the hardships: employment
discrimination, grossly insufficient child care facilities, inflation, and
inadequate spousal and child support awards aggravated by frequent
defaults. 40 These economic factors cause women's standard of living

37. Often sufficient property is unavailable. For example, Weitzman found that 60% of all
divorcing couples had less than $32,200 in assets (valued in 1984 dollars) to divide. See L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 57. But when available, marital property may provide the only
possible cushion against financial dislocation after divorce.
38. In 1981 courts awarded child support payments to only 59.2% of the 8.4 million divorced
women who maintained a single-parent household with at least one child. CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY, supra note 32, at 1-2. Only 46.7% of those women awarded child support actually
received full payment. Id. at 2. Of the remaining women, 25.1% received partial payment and
28.2% received nothing. Id. The average amount of child support collected was $2110. Id. at 1.
In total dollars, $4 billion out of the $10 billion in child support awards went unpaid nationwide
in 1981. See id. at 2. Despite an increase in the average amount of child support awarded from
1970 to 1981, these payments actually decreased by 16% in real dollars. Id. at 1. These amounts
accounted for only 13% of male income in both 1978 and 1981. Id. In 1985 custodial parents in
Florida collected only 7% of the child support awarded them. FLORIDA CENTER FOR CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, KEY FACTS ABOUT THE CHILDREN, at ii (1988). Although these figures include
child support awarded to married as well as unmarried women, they clearly reflect the extent
of the problem.
39. See generally T. ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL DILEMMAS (1986) (main trauma for divorced women is economic adjustment); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION 78, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (May 1983) (divorce and poverty highly correlated
for women); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 323-56. Homemakers often lose their health
insurance, social security protection, social status, and marital home as a consequence of divorce.
Homemakers are not the only individuals who experience economic pain after divorce. Over
one million children are involved in divorces each year. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, Feb. 28, 1985, at 1. Many of these children
live in female-headed single-parent families because the wife receives custody in 90% of dissolution actions. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 232. Ten million children live in femaleheaded single-parent families. Approximately 80% of these families result from divorce or separation. Id. at 350. Overall, one in three female-headed families lives in poverty. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2168, WOMEN AT WORK: A
CHARTBOOK 26 (1983).
40. WOMEN IN THE COURTS, supra note 32, at 80. For a vivid portrayal of individual
hardships and the magnitude of the problem, see T. ARENDELL, supra note 39.
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to drop significantly. One study found that, on the average, women's

standard of living drops by seventy-three percent after divorce. 41
In contrast, men do not experience the same economic deprivation
after divorce. Men usually enhance their earning abilities during the
marriage because significant domestic responsibilities have not impeded their career development.4 Upon divorce men generally retain
the income-producing marital assets. 43 Consequently, divorce usually
has a positive economic effect on men's standard of living. The abovementioned study found that men's postdivorce standard of living rises
on the average by forty-two percent. 44
Courts currently do not use equitable distribution to rectify either
the postdivorce economic disparities between the spouses or the problems associated with alimony and child support. Wives receive property awards in only a small number of dissolution cases and often in
negligible amounts.4 5 If the legislature adopts a presumption of equal
distribution, it also should expressly direct courts to award a larger
share of the marital property to the wife if she can demonstrate need
for a greater share of the marital property. 46 Equal division alone

41. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 323. Because of high noncompliance rates, the
study reported in Weitzman calculated the drop in wives' standard of living based on alimony
and child support awarded, rather than support actually received. Because the method assumed
payment of awards, the average drop likely was higher than reported. Id. at 324. The study
found significant disparities between husbands' and wives' postdivorce incomes. Id. at 323-56.
These disparities were greatest in the higher income groups. Id. at 329. Only in the dissolutions
of marriages that were over 18 years in length in the lowest income group did wives maintain
their predivorce standard of living. Id. at 332-34. However, in the dissolution of these marriages,
the courts allowed the husbands to retain a postdivorce income of almost twice that awarded
to the wives. Id.
42. Id. at -ii.
43. Id. at 97.
44. See id. at 323. Not surprisingly, one study found that wives attributed the postdivorce
economic discrepancy existing between themselves and their husbands to result from gender
bias in the law. T. ARENDELL, supra note 39, at 26. The method in which courts defined and
distributed marital assets particularly outraged the study sample. Id.
45. In 1981 courts awarded property to the wife in only 42% of 14.2 million divorces. See
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, supranote 34, at 2; see also Frumkes & Langan, supra note
31, at 14-20 (listing percentage distributions of assets to husbands and wives in several Florida
cases).
46. Kelso's comments about the need for flexibility in alimony awards are applicable to
equitable distribution awards: "changes in social need call for corresponding changes in rules of
law." Kelso, supra note 21, at 186. While the high divorce rate is a recent phenomenon, courts
and legislatures should consider the clear causal link between divorce and the rise in the poverty
rate of women when developing rules for distributing marital property. See L. WEITZmAN,
supra note 17, at xviii, 400-01.
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might promote equal treatment, but its use would ignore economic
47
disparities and the defects of other available remedies.
Because courts cannot modify equitable distribution awards, awarding the wife a larger share of the marital assets risks that she will
receive a windfall if future events eliminate or reduce her need. Any
system of property allocation, however, contains instances in which
future events will make the award inappropriate. Thus, courts should
make property awards to satisfy needs most likely to occur rather
than make awards in anticipation of unusual, unforeseeable future
events. The current distribution approach is inadequate as it subjects
women to real, quantifiable economic deprivations.

III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION AND ALIMONY: ALTERNATIVE FORMS
OF PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
A historical understanding of equitable distribution and alimony is
necessary to understand how courts presently accomplish equitable
distribution.48 The two remedies originated from separate bodies of
law and still serve partially distinct purposes. Strict separation of the
two remedies, however, is impossible. Together their purpose is to
effect equity, whether equity is controlled by issues of contribution
or need.
A.

Alimony

Alimony originated in the ecclesiastic courts of England. 49 Because
the common law reduced wives to legal dependents of their husbands

47.

See Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48

N.Y.U. L. REv. 212, 213 (1973).

48. Trial courts have numerous methods to distribute property upon dissolution: equitable
distribution, alimony, special equity, child support, and exclusive possession. This paper only
will discuss special equity, child support, and exclusive possession as they relate to equitable
distribution.
49. Regulation of marriage became the exclusive province of the Church after the Norman
Conquest. H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 21. The Church regulated marriage under the canon
law in the ecclesiastical courts. Id. at 31. For a detailed historical background of alimony, see
Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory
Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939).

Because family law was the province of the ecclesiastical courts and because church doctrine
viewed marriage as a permanent relationship, absolute divorces originally were prohibited.
Marriage lasted "until death do us part." See H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 619. Eventually,
Parliament began to grant absolute divorces. An absolute divorce had the effect of barring any
alimony award to the wife due to her lack of marital status. See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra, at
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and restricted their ability to hold property, 5° courts required husbands
to continue to support their wives after divorce.5' Alimony served the
express purpose of support and gave the wife no vested property

rights.

2

Because alimony partially originated to compensate wives for their
inability to hold property separately, it served as a form of property
division.5 Married women now can own property separately; 54 however, the traditional role still prevents most wives from separately
acquiring significant amounts of property. Alimony continues to partially divide the marital assets by compensating wives for their contributions during marriage.r This property distribution function is en-

196, 201. In 1857 Parliament passed the Divorce Act of 1857, which transferred divorce jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts to the common law courts. Id. at 197-98. Legislation also
permitted alimony after an absolute divorce to remedy the harsh effects to the wife due to her
reliance on her husband's promises of support. Id. at 199-200.
50. Ownership of the wife's tangible personal property passed to her husband upon marriage
and control of her realty passed to him under the doctrine of jure uxoris. If the couple had
children, the husband acquired only a life estate in the wife's realty. Any realty transferred to
the wife during the marriage became jointly owned with the husband, and the husband exercised
sole control over such property. The husband also had legal right to all of the wife's earnings
during the marriage. Moreover, the wife could not contract, sue, or be sued during the marriage.
See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum,
and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1044-46 (1972). The law also
severely restricted employment opportunities for women. See H. CLARK, supranote 22, at 619.
Underlying these factors was the belief that women were the weaker sex. See Johnston,
supra, at 1046. Laws enforcing women's dependency symbolized this belief. Id. at 1044-48. The
husband had an obligation to provide support, and the wife had the obligation to perform
domestic responsibilities and to care for the children. Id. Marriage thus had an element of
reciprocity, which alimony perpetuated upon divorce. See L. WniTz=LN, supra note 17, at 11.
In this system, alimony rewarded the wife who fulfilled her marital role by guaranteeing her
lifetime support. Id.
51. See H. CLARK, upra note 22, at 619-20. To receive an alimony award, the wife must
demonstrate her need and her husband's ability to pay. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 353 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla. 449, 456 (1868) (permanent periodic alimony did
not give the wife vested rights in her husband's estate but only entitled her to continuous
periodic support payments).
53. See H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 619.
54. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
55. The criteria courts consider to determine an appropriate alimony award indicate that
alimony addresses need and entitlement. In making an alimony award, courts consider the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the marital resources, the length of the marriage,
and each party's contributions to the marriage. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1989); H. CLARK,
supra note 22, at 641-44. One commentator has suggested that alimony serves to remedy the
inequities found in equitable distribution laws. See id. at 643.
The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the dual role of periodic alimony: "while permanent
periodic alimony is most commonly used to provide support, in limited circumstances its use
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hanced in dissolutions involving children or long marriages in which
wives' contributions tend to be more readily apparent to courts.5
B.

Equitable Distribution

Equitable distribution is a recently developed remedy in most common law jurisdictions. 57 Community property jurisdictions have long
empowered courts to distribute marital property using partnership
theory as the theoretical springboard. Some commentators have asserted that equality is the foundation upon which partnership is based
in community property jurisdictions.59

may be appropriate to balance such inequities as might result from the allocation of incomegenerating properties acquired during the marriage." Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197,
1202 (Fla. 1980). The Canakariscourt also noted that both lump sum and permanent periodic
alimony are important in resolving property disposition and support requirements. Id. at 1200.
The court emphasized that all dissolution remedies interrelate as "part of one overall scheme."
Id. at 1202.
56. See H. CLARK, supra note 22, at 641-42.
57. Before the turn of the century, common law courts almost uniformly refused to redistribute title upon divorce. Cf. Oldham, supranote 13, at 263 n.1 (during the nineteenth century,
almost all common law states divided property by title). All states now have statutory provisions
distributing property upon divorce. Note, supra note 24, at 415. One commentator called equitable distribution a "deferred community property approach" because of its similarity to the
community property approach. See Oldham, supra note 13, at 263-64; see also Krauskopf, supra
note 17, at 173 (statute empowering courts to divide marital property intended to support
partnership concept of marriage).
58. For a thorough analysis of community property principles, see W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971). The theory is that property
acquired during the marriage is community property: "[Bjecause it is acquired by the labor of
...
a marital partnership[,]... whatever is earned or gained by one marital partner during
the existence of the marital partnership must accrue to the benefit of both marital partners."
Id. at 128.
Eight states distribute property according to some derivation of the community property
system: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
Community property concepts predate common law property concepts. See Younger, supra note
47, at 214 n.15; see also Lobinger, The Marital Community: Its Origin and Diffusion - A
Problem of Comparative Law, 14 A.B.A. J. 211 (1928) (early examples of community property
are found in the Visigothic Code).
59. See, e.g., W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 58, at 3 (2d ed. 1971). This
assertion overgeneralizes because only two of the eight community property jurisdictions require
an equal division of property: California and Nevada. See Comment, supra note 27, at 1278 n.53.
Professor Younger argues that, while community property states theoretically treat all marital property as commonly owned property, reality falls short of theory in the other six community
property jurisdictions. See Younger, supra note 47, at 218. She views the possibility that the
wife may lose or gain more than half of the community property as contrary to the precepts
of community property. Id. at 242; see also Daggett, Division of Property upon Dissolution of
Marriage, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 225, 230 (1939) ("As community property is acquired
or augmented it vests in the husband and wife equally . . . ."). Professor Younger advocated
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Common law jurisdictions borrowed equitable distribution from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 6 which adopted community property concepts of marital property. 61 The guiding rationale for an equitable distribution is that marriage is a partnership; both spouses have
contributed to the accumulation of marital assets and have earned an
interest in the marital assets upon divorce.63 Trial courts traditionally
have used their discretion to determine the precise interest each
spouse will receive.63 Recently, however, some legislatures and courts
have adopted a presumption of equal division in response to research
indicating that courts consistently undervalue wives' contributions. 4
Like alimony, equitable distribution serves a dual function. The
6
express rationale is to allocate to the wife her earned contribution. 5
Equitable distribution also serves a support function.6 The fact that

a rule of strict equal division to avoid judicial discretion. See Younger, supra note 47, at 259
(equal division is jeopardized "in most community property jurisdictions by the possibility of
discretion."). While Florida case law supports the conclusion that unfettered judicial discretion
produces inequitable results, Professor Younger's solution is not logically necessary. Legislative
guidelines that permit a disproportionate distribution to remedy economic disparities must supplement inflexible community property concepts.
Any deviation from a 50-50 split departs from equal treatment of the husband and wife.
Equal treatment, however, promotes inequality because of the inequality inherent in traditional
roles. See Stark, supra note 17, at 1176-80. Florida is free to deviate from an equal distribution
of marital assets to alleviate postdivorce economic disparities. Cf. Kelso, supra note 21, at 212
(courts in general are being given greater freedom to revise decrees). Community property
should effectuate common ownership or control, not equal division upon dissolution.
60. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT 307, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
61. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 13, § 1.02.
62. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
63. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 13, § 8.05.
64. See id. § 8.06; see also L. WEITZmAN, supranote 17, at 384 (equal distribution presumption would fully incorporate partnership and allow the flexibility necessary to deal with the
economic fallout of divorce). Five states have statutorily imposed presumptions of equal division.
See supra note 15. Other states have judicially imposed an equal division as a starting point
for equitable distribution. See, e.g., Ente v. Ente, 442 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983);
Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981); see also L. GOLDEN, supra note
14, at § 8.06.
65. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 14, § 1.01.
66. See Boyer & Ramers, Equitable Distributionin Florida:Redistributing the Bundle of
Rights and Responsibilities, FLA. B.J. 31, 31 (Dec. 1988) (equitable distribution not a remedy
entirely distinct from alimony); see also Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496,
501 (1974) (courts may use property award to provide wife with support because it provides
security that alimony, due to its precariousness, cannot provide); Krauskopf, supra note 17, at
165 (equitable distribution intended to serve contribution and support functions). See generally
Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to
Address Need, 56 FORDHA.A L. REV. 827, 831-44 (1988) (tracing incorporation of need factors
into equitable distribution statutes).
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courts respect title to marital property until divorce demonstrates the

support function of equitable distribution. Wives are not legally entitled to a share of the marital property until dissolution because only
then does a wife's dependency require a remedy. Legislatures have
left the determination of a wife's share of the marital property to the
67
trial courts' discretion so that courts can address individual equities,
including need.
IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
IN FLORIDA

Prior to the advent of lump sum alimony, 69 Florida courts could
not transfer title in a dissolution action. If the wife held no property
in her own name during the marriage, she would not gain title to the
marital assets after the divorce. Title reigned as king. Alimony served
as the sole property distribution remedy available to the wife, absent
any extraordinary contributions by the wife to the marriage entitling
her to a special equity. 70
Both the legislature and the judiciary now acknowledge that strict
reliance on title is inequitable. Both groups gradually have recognized
that homemakers, like wage earners, contribute to the accumulation
of marital assets.7 1 This shift in attitudes from the rigid common law
title approach has led to the adoption of the partnership approach in
distributing marital property. 72 The partnership approach treats mar67. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 14, §§ 8.05-.06.
68. See id. Florida's equitable distribution statute expressly requires courts to consider the
economic circumstances of the parties, the duration of the marriage, and any interruption of
career or education of either party. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(b)-(d) (Supp. 1988). These factors
require a court to consider an economically dependent wife's needs. See infra notes 111-14 and
accompanying text.
69. Florida first authorized lump sum alimony in 1947. Act of June 3, 1947, ch. 23894, §
65.08, 1947 Fla. Laws 539 (amended in 1963). In its initial form lump sum alimony was an
alternative to periodic alimony because the statute prohibited the award of both. See id. In
1963 the legislature amended the statute essentially to its modern form by allowing courts to
award the remedies jointly or independently. Act of Sept. 1, 1963, ch. 63-145, § 65.08, 1963
Fla. Laws 306. Despite statutory authorization courts prior to Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974), awarded lump sum alimony only in limited situations. See Yandell v.
Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 1949).
70. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fla. 1980).
71. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (1989).
72. For an overview of how other common law states incorporated partnership, see Comment, supra note 27, at 1310. An early example of the utilization of the partnership approach
is the statutory adoption of lump sum alimony. Cf. Brown, 300 So. 2d at 723, 726 (noting the
1947 statutory adoption of lump sum alimony in Florida and the application of the partnership
approach in awarding lump sum alimony). The judiciary also expressed approval of partnership.
See Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1972) ("[Spouses] now occupy a
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riage as a voluntary contract "entitl[ing each spouse] to a fair share
of the fruits of their combined industry, whether performed in the
'
office, the factory, the fields or the home."
In Florida the concept of no-fault divorce 74 changed marriage from
an indissoluble union to a breachable contract. 75 After the legislature
enacted the no-fault divorce provisions, the judiciary adopted the view
that each spouse has equal rights during the marriage and equal burdens upon divorce.76 Strict equality implies that the wife is as able to
support herself after divorce as her husband; therefore, this conception
of marriage has negative consequences for women who usually have
far lower earning capacities than their former husbands.7 The concept
of marriage as a partnership is at least partially derived from these
new conceptions of marriage and their economic repercussions. 78
position of equal partners in the family relationship resulting from marriage, and more often
than not contribute a full measure to the economic well-being of the family unit."). The First
District Court of Appeal reaffirmed its commitment to the concept of partnership the next year.
See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973) ("[Marriage] places both
parties to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing equal rights and
obligations in the marriage relationship[,] and sharing equal burdens in the event of dissolution.").
Although in both instances the court relied on partnership theory to justify reversing an award
of permanent alimony due to the wife's supposed equal earning capacity, the court's broad words
respecting partnership apply to property distribution. See, e.g., Brown, 300 So. 2d 719. Overwhelming statistical data, however, contradicts the court's presumption that an individual wife
is equally capable of supporting herself postdivorce as her husband. See Comment, supra note
27, at 1310.
73. Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
74. Marriage as an institution has undergone radical changes since the adoption of no-fault
divorce. For example, currently one in two marriages ends in divorce. See L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 17, at ix. The concept of marriage as a support institution has been eroded significantly. Glendon, Modern MarriageLaw and its UnderlyingAssumptions: The New Marriage
and the New Property, 13 FArm. L.Q. 441, 442-43 (1980). The First District Court of Appeal
recognized the trend in Florida in 1974 proclaiming that "a new day has been created by the
1971 legislative enactment." See Brown, 300 So. 2d at 725.
75. See Oldham, &upra
note 13, at 270-72.
76. See Brown, 300 So. 2d 719.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
78. No-fault divorce has had negative economic consequences for wives because of the
courts' reluctance to grant wives sufficient property or alimony to ensure their economic viability.
See Letts, All Quiet on the Domestic Front, 59 FLA. B.J., Nov. 1985, at 17; see also McClindon,
supra note 28, at 352 (no-fault divorce has had a significant negative economic effect on women
because of the changed conceptions of women's potential for self-sufficiency). Although the law
is gender-neutral, women bear the economic brunt of divorce upon demand. Some commentators
believe that prior to the enactment of no-fault divorce in Florida, fault was an important
bargaining chip for wives in settlement negotiations. See Letts, supra, at 21. Making unilateral
divorce possible eliminated the bargaining power wives once had to withhold their agreement
to the divorce in exchange for a favorable settlement. See id. Recognizing the wife's value by
presuming her entitlement to half of the marital assets would help mitigate some of the economic
disadvantages that no-fault divorce has created. See Kulzer, supra note 25, at 4 n.13.
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Adoption of Partnership:Brown v. Brown

Florida courts first expressed the philosophical underpinnings of
equitable distribution in Brown v. Brown.79 In Brown the couple
accumulated $233,000 in marital assets over a twenty-one-year marriage. 80 During the marriage the couple assumed traditional roles.,
The wife abandoned her career as a nurse to be a housewife and
2
mother while the husband pursued a lucrative career as a C.P.A.
Neither spouse brought any assets into the marriage. The husband
held title to all the couple's assets that accumulated during the marriage. 14 The case thus starkly presented the inequity to the wife associated with the common law title approach to property distribution.
The court circumvented an inequitable result by finding that no-fault
divorce had altered the law.s The court held that trial courts could
now use lump sum alimony, not only as an extraordinary remedy, but
also to "[adjust] the material wealth of the parties. " The contributions
of each party would dictate whether a trial court would award lump
sum alimony. 7
B.

Adoption of Equitable DistributionVia the Vehicle of
Lump Sum Alimony: Canakaris v. Canakaris

The Brown decision is an early example of equitable distribution.
Prior to passage of Florida's statute prescribing equitable distribution,
Florida courts routinely effected equitable distribution pursuant to
5 The Florida Supreme Court expressly adopted
judicial authority.A

79.

300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).

80. Id. at 721.
81. Id.
82.

Id.

83. Id.
84. See id. at 721-22 (the husband accumulated all the wealth while the wife cared for the
family).
85. Id. at 721.
86. Id. The Brown court found that no-fault divorce changed dissolution law in another

manner. Courts no longer would award alimony as a matter of right but only upon a showing
of need and ability to pay. Id.
87. Id. at 726. The court found that a contribution could take the form of assisting in the
accumulation of wealth or rendering homemaking services. Id.
88. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980) ('judge may award
lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage,
provided the evidence reflects (1) a justification for such lump sum payment and (2) financial
ability of the other spouse to make such payment without substantially endangering his or her
own economic status") (citation omitted); Turner v. Turner, 529 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1988) ("[e]quitable distribution is a mechanism developed by the Florida courts to achieve a fair
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equitable distribution in Canakarisv. Canakaris9 by extending the
remedy of lump sum alimony authorized in Florida Statutes section
61.08, Florida's alimony statute.90 Aligning itself with the Brown court,
the Canakaris court expressly declared that an award of lump sum
alimony is not limited to "instances of support or vested property
interests."91 Canakarisinstead empowered trial courts to grant lump
sum alimony to effect an equitable distribution of marital property if
the alimony-seeking spouse demonstrated both justification for the
92
award and the other spouse's financial ability to pay for it.
Although the Canakaris court claimed simply to interpret the
alimony statute, its rationale radically departed from the traditional
rationale for alimony. Instead of considering the wife's need, the court
used the wife's contribution as an appropriate justification for lump
sum alimony. 93 Lump sum alimony, like equitable distribution, differs
from traditional alimony because it vests wives with property rights.
Although the court sought to legitimize lump sum alimony by finding
authorization in the alimony statute, the Canakaris court judicially
created a new equitable "vehicle." This new vehicle conflicted with
common law doctrine that considered title the sole arbiter of property
rights.9 The case thus signaled the adoption of equitable distribution
in Florida.
The Canakariscourt clearly did not intend courts to employ equitable distribution to the exclusion of alimony. The court noted that
equitable distribution and periodic alimony are both important remedies to resolve property and support issues. 9- The court distinguished

division of marital assets acquired during the marriage"); Lyons v. Lyons, 436 So. 2d 156, 158
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983) ("tial court failed to give the required weight to the wife's contribution
to this long-term marriage"); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980)
("trial judge awarded the husband's interest as lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distri-

bution of property acquired during the marriage").
89. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). When the Florida Supreme Court issued Canakaris, it
issued two other property distribution opinions. See Ingrain v. Ingrain, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.
1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980). Canakarisis the seminal case, and the
three cases often are referred to collectively as "Canakaris."
90. 382 So. 2d at 1201.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
95. 382 So. 2d at 1200. Later in the opinion, the court referred to the remedies as part of
"one overall scheme." Id. at 1202. The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach in a
later case by stating "[W]e adhere to the preexisting vehicle, lump-sum alimony... ." Tronconi
v. Tronconi, 446 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1985); see also Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952 ("We fully

recognize that the disposition of property and support payments are mutually dependent.").
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the two remedies by recognizing that equitable distribution, unlike
periodic alimony, gives the wife a vested property interest.9
V.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION SINCE CAAiAKARIS

A.

Defining Justification

Following the rule of Canakaris, Florida appellate courts require
97
wives to prove both justification and their husbands' ability to pay
before entering a property award. Courts have recognized several
justifications for property awards. A wife can contribute her earnings
from separate employment to the marriage,9 assist with the family
business,9 or serve the family as a homemaker and childrearer.c1°

96. The Canakaris court implied other distinctions. First, because alimony awards do not
create a vested property interest, courts may modify them upon a showing of changed circumstances, see Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954); FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989),
and they generally are terminable either on the remarriage of the wife or at the death of either
spouse. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973). Equitable distribution awards
do not suffer from these shortcomings because, like lump sum alimony, they vest once awarded.
See Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1949). Courts may modify the payment plan of an
equitable distribution, like the payment plan of an alimony award. See, e.g., Cotton v. Cotton,
439 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
Second, alimony awards are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1989).
Property awards are dischargeable. However, to the extent that the property award provides
support, a bankruptcy court may determine that the award is analogous to an alimony award
and is, therefore, nondischargeable. The bankruptcy court has the power to make this determination because dischargeability is a matter of federal, not state, law. See, e.g., In re Cox, 68
B.R. 307 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (when court awards amount in conjunction with the marital home
and the couple has minor children, property award is in nature of support and is nondischargeable). But see In re Norton, 65 B.R. 140 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (when award gives wife vested right
without regard to her future needs it is a dischargeable property settlement). For an excellent
article on the vagaries of dischargeability, see Gold, The Dischargeabilityof Divorce Obligations
Under the Bankruptcy Code: Five Faulty Premises in the Application of Section 523(a)(5), 39
CASE W. RES. 455 (1988-89).
Third, alimony awards are taxable either to the payor or payee spouse while property awards
are nontaxable to both spouses unless paid in cash. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 245 (1986); H. CLARK,
supranote 22, at 592-93. Ifproperty awards are paid in cash they may be taxed as alimony. Id.
97. An award exceeding the husband's ability to pay is an abuse of discretion. Stith v.
Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
98. See, e.g., Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1988); Manuel v. Manuel,
498 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986); Lyons v. Lyons, 436 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
99. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 492 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984); White v. White,
429 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983).
100. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Holcomb, 505 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987); Danoff v.
Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987); Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1986); Cowan v. Cowan, 389 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980); Cuevas v. Cuevas,
381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
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These contributions justify an equitable distribution even if they do
not directly produce marital assets.101 Need also may serve to enlarge
the size of the award, but contribution remains the prerequisite for
an equitable distribution. 102 Once the wife justifies an equitable distribution and her husband's ability to pay, trial courts can enter an
equitable distribution award. The wife is not entitled automatically to
an equal distribution after furnishing justification, however.10
Because courts fail to recognize that both spouses usually contribute
equally to the marriage, property distribution awards consistently
have been unequalo4 or unfair. 0 5 Wives typically receive a property

101. If a trial court focuses solely on the wife's direct contribution to the acquisition of
marital assets, it is reversible error. E.g., Sanders, 492 So. 2d at 707; Buttner, 484 So. 2d at
1265. Appellate courts have required trial courts to focus on the wife's total contribution to the
marriage. This contribution might be directed partially towards asset accumulation or might
take the form of homemaking and childrearing. See id.
102. See, e.g., Decker v. Decker, 534 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988) (justification found
in wife's contributions and financial dependency); Coll v. Coll, 507 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1987) (wife's need justified award when wife coconceived business idea with husband and her
efforts contributed to its success); Philpose v. Philpose, 431 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983)
(justification for equitable distribution furnished by dowry given to husband by wife's family);
Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 396 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (justification found in wife's
contributions and in fact that award necessary to ensure wife's bare survival); Bird v. Bird,
385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980) (husband's violent tendencies justified lump sum award
to accomplish severing all contact between the parties).
103. See, e.g., Dewberry v. Dewberry, 455 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (marriage
entitles each spouse to an equitable, not equal, share). Although some court decisions contain
language suggesting a presumption of an equal division, these courts did not seriously intend
to promote equality. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 543 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1989) (although
equal award "a good starting point," equal award overturned because too generous to wife);
Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (equal award a "good
starting point" - but award of only 14% of the marital assets to wife affirmed). But see Ente
v. Ente, 442 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983) ("equality of treatment of equals is equitable"
language consistent with equal award).
104. In Frunikes & Langan, supra note 31, at 12, the authors list 36 Florida state appellate
decisions, from Canakaristhrough the year 1986, in which the distribution percentage can be
discerned. See id. at 14-20. An analysis of the cited cases reveals that the average award to
the wife was 25% of the marital assets. In 21 cases the wife received less than half of the
assets. Only 4 of these 21 cases were reversed on appeal.
In 15 of the 36 cases, the wife received more than half of the marital assets. Nine of these
cases were reversed on appeal. Moreover, in every case in which the appellate court sustained
the trial court's judgment of greater than half of the marital assets to the wife, the marital
home comprised more than half of the total marital assets. The trend continues. See, e.g., Moore,
543 So. 2d at 252; Simon v. Simon, 542 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989).
Even when courts pay lip service to equal awards, they generally resolve distribution in
favor of the husband. See, e.g., Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d at 1374-75 (equal award a "good starting
point," but award of only 14% of the marital assets to wife affirmed). The Canakariscourt
clearly did not intend to mandate equal division of the marital assets between the spouses.
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award approximately equivalent to the traditional dower right, or
one-fourth of the marital property. 1°6 Husbands typically receive a
disproportionately large share of the marital assets because their contribution can be more readily quantified monetarily.107 Another explaCanakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203-04. Instead, the court left trial courts to determine an equitable
distribution. The net effect has been unequal awards favoring the husband. The problem of
gender bias is probably larger than it appears in the appellate cases because few cases are
appealed. The small amount of property generally subject to dispute makes appeals impractical
for most litigants, underscoring the need for a presumption of equal division.
105. Florida courts rarely award the wife an equal share of the marital assets unless her
contribution has exceeded that of her husband. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 508 So. 2d 23
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987); Grimmett v. Grimmett, 452 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982); Ente,
442 So. 2d at 232. An appellate court is likely to overturn an award to the wife of greater than
half of the marital assets unless the wife is exceptionally needy. See, e.g., Wynn v. Wynn, 478
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985); see also Frumkes & Langan, supra note 31, at 12. Even if
the wife is exceptionally needy in relation to her husband, a disproportionate award to the wife
rarely will survive appellate review. See, e.g., Rico v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1986) (award of marital home to non-English-speaking wife out of job market for 10 years
overturned because unfair to self-employed electrician husband).
Florida is not alone in its inequitable treatment of wives. A study by two New York matrimonial lawyers of the first 26 cases decided under that state's equitable distribution statute revealed
that 17 of the 26 decisions gave a larger share to the husband than to the wife while only two
cases gave a larger share to the wife. The study could not classify the remaining 7 cases due
to the insignificance of the assets involved. All of the cases involving significant assets favored
the husband. See Bouton, Women and Divorce, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 8, 1984, at 36. In New Jersey,
the New Jersey Supreme Court's Task Force found that lawyers throughout New Jersey perceived that the judges applied an unofficial outer limit of 35% to 40% on the amount of property
awarded to the wife. WOMEN IN THE COURTS, supra note 32, at 101.
106. See Frumkes & Langan, supra note 31, at 12. Typically, an appellate court will find
that a trial court abused its discretion only if the trial court's award falls far below a third of
the marital assets. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 534 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1988) (award
to wife of 29% of marital asset valued at $1,400,000 would not have been an abuse of discretion,
but award of 10% was an abuse of discretion).
107. Florida courts do not ignore completely wives' contributions. Florida courts often
expressly recognize the contribution that traditional wives make to the marriage. One court
summarized the law by stating: "[The] fact that one spouse had a more active role in [marital
asset] acquisition . . . does not defeat the claim of the spouse who contributed to the family
welfare by working within the home." Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1986).
The problem is that courts denigrate these contributions. See infra notes 124-66 and accompanying text. But see Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (although equal
distribution is not required, appellate court reversed award in the absence of a rationale for
awarding wife only one-third of marital assets); Sanders v. Sanders, 492 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1986) (appellate court reversed and remanded to trial court award of 27% of marital
assets to wife with admonition that trial court consider not only wife's direct contribution to
her husband's business but also her domestic contributions). Usually, the award must be grossly
disproportionate to justify reversal. See, e.g., Russell, 543 So. 2d at 803 (when principal marital
asset was valued at $1,400,000, award to wife of $400,000 would not be an abuse of discretion,
but $142,000 was an abuse of discretion).
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nation for this disparity in treatment may be that ninety-two percent
of Florida judges are men, who may more easily identify and understand the husbands' marital role. 08
The inequalities and inequities of typical property distributions also
result from the lack of statutory guidance as to what constitutes an
equitable distribution. °0 The new equitable distribution statute unlikely will improve distribution because courts may still attach a relative value to each spouse's contribution without being required to
justify their judgment by written findings of fact. A presumption of
equal division is needed.
B.

Statutory Analysis

The equitable distribution statute requires trial courts to distribute
the marital assets equitably. Courts may consider any factor necessary
to render an equitable distribution"10 but must consider the following:
(a) each spouse's contribution to the marriage, including homemaking and childrearing;
(b) the economic circumstances of the parties;
(c) the duration of the marriage;
(d) any interruption of a career or education;
(e) the contribution to the other spouse's career or education;
(f) the desirability of retaining any asset solely in the hands of one
spouse;
(g) the contribution of each spouse to producing income or improving, or incurring, liabilities.",
The statute's express criteria allow trial courts to assess each
spouse's contributions. Many of the criteria, although couched in contribution language, address wives' needs. For instance, under subsecNeither the equitable distribution nor the alimony statute requires unequal results. Both
statutes contain criteria recognizing housewives' contributions. Unequal awards indicate, however, that courts do not take housewives' contributions seriously.
108.

See Carres, Gender Bias: Its Effects on Justice in Florida, THE POLICIES STUDIES

CLINIC, FLA. STATE UNiv. 47 (1986). While the results reported show subtle sexism, the
chauvinism can be blatant. See, e.g., Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989)
(fact that wife was an ornament justified award of 25% of marital estate to her).
109. The equitable distribution statute acknowledges what Freed and Foster recognized 15
years ago as the "belated but growing recognition that the roles of wife as homemaker, wife,
and mother, should be deemed 'partnership activity' and should entitle her to a share of the
family assets accumulated during the marriage." Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce,
7 FAm.L.Q. 275, 277 (1973). The failure of the legislature to give guidance as to what constitutes
a fair share has invited courts to employ their discretion in awarding property in a biased
fashion against wives.
110.

FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(h) (1989).

111.

Id. § 61.075(1)(a)-(g).
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tion (a), if a wife contributed to a marriage by homemaking or childrearing, she likely will have impaired her economic potential after
divorce by her absence from the marketplace during her marriage.
Also, some of these criteria implicitly consider that a wife, by foregoing
a career and contributing to the family in a noneconomic manner, may
have relied on her husband's continued support.1 2
In comparison, under the alimony statute 3 the legislature requires
courts to consider:
(a) the marital standard of living;
(b) the duration of the marriage;
(c) the age and the physical and the emotional condition of each
party;
(d) the financial resources of each party;
(e) the time necessary for each party to acquire sufficient education
or training necessary to obtain appropriate employment;
(t) the marital contributions for each party, including those rendered
in homemaking, childcare, education or career building of the other
party;
4
(g) any other equitable factor.1
In drafting the equitable distribution statute, the legislature omitted the criteria that in the alimony statute15 most related to need.
The equitable distribution statute also emphasizes contribution in the
three criteria that expressly mention contribution. 116 The alimony statute expressly mentions only one contribution criterion." 7
The legislature, however, likely did not envision strict separation
of contribution and need in drafting the equitable distribution statute
because it contains criteria that concern both considerations. Concluding that the legislature intended strict separation would be ironic
because, when it amended the alimony statute, the legislature retained
the only contribution criterion the statute contained." 8 The equitable
distribution statute emphasizes need to a lesser degree than the
alimony statute, but the lines between contribution and need remain
blurred. The legislature apparently considered the two justifications
part of one unified scheme. Because contribution and need overlap in

112. See generally Brinig & Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriageand Divorce, 62
TUL. L. REV. 855 (1988) (law should compensate spouses who relinquish career opportunities
to benefit family in anticipation of future support).
113. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1989).
114. Id. § 61.08(2)(a)-(f).
115. Compare id. § 61.075(1) with id. § 61.08(2)(a), (c), (e).
116. See id. § 61.075(1)(a), (e), (g).
117. See id. § 61.08(2)(f).
118. Compare id. § 61.075(1) with id. § 61.08(2)(f).
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the equitable distribution statute, the implied legislative intent is that
courts should continue to follow Canakaris by requiring justification
or contribution as a prerequisite to considering need in rendering an
equitable distribution.
C.

Judicial Discretion

The equitable distribution statute vests trial courts with practically
unfettered discretion in determining an appropriate property award
to each spouse." 9 Only if the appellate court determines that the trial
court abused its discretion can the appellate court overturn the trial
court's decision. 20 Such a finding is rare because the alimony statute,
like the equitable distribution statute, does not limit trial courts' consideration to a limited set of criteria, but rather empowers trial courts
to consider "any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.' 12 Because judges need not state the bases for

their property distributions, this provision allows trial judges' individual biases to play an important part in equitable distribution awards.
D.

What Are Wives' Contributions Worth Upon Divorce?:
Marston v. Marston

As the Canakaris court noted, equitable distribution and alimony
are part of "one overall scheme."'' An equitable distribution should
provide ample property to the wife to compensate her for her contribution to the marriage and should provide for her future security if
possible and necessary. Appellate courts, however, have given only

119. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 14, at 99-100. The trial court's broad
discretion in dissolution actions gives the trial judge the power to discriminate. Id.; see also
Baxter, Family Law Reform in Ontario, 25 U. TORONTo L. REv. 236, 260-61 (1975) ("[0]pen
ended discretion (even with guidelines) is really the antithesis of economic partnership."). In
no other field of law is judicial discretion given freer rein than in the field of domestic relations.
Cooey, The Exercise of JudicialDiscretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 213, 213 (1939).

Commentators in other areas of law have noted the potential prejudice inherent in unfettered
discretion. See, e.g., LaFave, The Prosecuto'sDiscretionin the United States, 18 AmI. J. ComnP.
L. 532, 533-39 (1970) (prosecutorial discretion to exercise power leniently implies the corresponding discretion to wield power arbitrarily). The solutions offered in other areas of law to ensure
accountability would apply with equal force to equitable distribution. Cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-90, 224-25 (1969) (if the prosecutor is to have
discretionary power, law should require the prosecutor to announce the office's general policies
and to apply these policies uniformly to individual cases).
120. Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1985).
121. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(h) (1989).
122. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
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lip service to the goal of distributing property to the wife based on
what she has earned during the marriage and instead have focused
on her need.
Marston v. Marstonl'2 demonstrates how Florida courts have focused on need to the exclusion of distribution.'2 The Marston court
awarded the husband eighty-three percent of the marital assets and
the wife only seventeen percent of the marital assets despite the lack
of any evidence showing that the husband contributed more to the
marriage than the wife.'2 Such a disparity casts a long shadow on
Florida's commitment to partnership.
The Marstons married in 1964 during their freshman year of college. '2
Because they both attended in-state schools,m the parties roughly had
the same economic potential when they married. The couple explicitly
or implicitly agreed to assume traditional roles. Pregnant before marriage, the wife dropped out of college to be with her husbandlas The
husband completed college and became a highly successful C.P.A.M
By the divorce he owned two restaurants and sat on the board of
directors of several corporations.' 30 During the marriage the wife cared
for the couple's two children and maintained the family home1 31 while
the husband maintained his C.P.A. practice and his numerous other
business interests. 13
After a nineteen-and-one-half-year marriage the parties divorced.3
The wife testified that she filed for divorce because she no longer could
tolerate her husband's extramarital affairs.1'4 Financially, the marriage
123. 484 So. 2d 32 (2d D.C.A.), reh'g denied, 494 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1986).
124. Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Appellant's Initial Brief at 4, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 6-7.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 5-6. The wife presented extensive evidence of her contributions including: keeping
the domestic budget and paying all household bills; working in her husband's C.P.A. firm;
working in the yard; cooking; and childrearing and its attendant demands such as sewing all
the children's clothes and organizing for, participating in, and delivering the children to their
numerous activities. Id.
132. Marston, 484 So. 2d at 33.
133. Id.
134. Id. The husband presented no evidence contradicting the wife's assertion that he had
engaged in numerous extramarital affairs. Appellant's Initial Brief at 4-5, Marston, 484 So. 2d at
32 (No. 84-2410); see also Appellee's Answer Brief at 1-2, Marston, 484 So. 2d at 32 (Appeal
No. 84-2410) (statement of facts does not contest this point). The husband introduced no evidence
that his wife had engaged in any extramarital sexual relations. Id. Clearly, the small property
award to the wife was not based on fault because, if it had been, the husband's adultery would
have resulted in a larger share to the wife.
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had flourished. The parties' net worth totaled slightly over $1,000,000
at the time of the divorce. 135 During the year prior to the divorce, the
husband received $220,000 in income. 136 At the time of the divorce,
1 37
the husband held title to almost all of the marital assets individually.
In the equitable distribution, the wife received only $195,000 of
the assets compared with the husband's award of $981,000 of the
assets, despite uncontroverted evidence that the husband had promised the wife during the marriage that half of the marital investments
belonged to her. 138 The wife's share consisted of the following: total
interest in the marital home valued at $90,000; the contents of the
home; $60,000 cash; her jewelry; a mortgage valued at $13,000; and
a $15,000 car. 39 The court augmented this equitable distribution award
with child support of $500 and permanent monthly alimony of $3500,
secured by an insurance policy with a face value of $250,000 until the
wife reached fifty when the face value declined to $100,000.140 The
support order constituted twenty-one percent of the husband's income
in the year prior to the divorce.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award and
summarily dismissed the wife's argument that equitable distribution
requires an equal division of the marital assets.'4 ' The appellate court
concluded that the nature of the assets justified the trial court's disproportionate award 1 ' The appellate court found that the trial court
must have accepted the husband's testimony that over $700,000 of the
assets were closely held interests."'3 The court determined that the
wife would have received no income from the closely held assets because, as a minority shareholder, she could not have forced dividend
payments.'4 Moreover, the court reasoned that the substantial periodic
135.

Marston, 484 So. 2d at 33.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Appellant's Initial Brief at 7, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410). But see Appellee's
Answer Brief at 1, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410) (contesting that the parties had any

form of a contract).
139. Marston, 484 So. 2d at 33.
140. Id. The Florida Supreme Court recently has upheld the use of life insurance to secure
an alimony award under FLA. STAT. § 61.08(3) (1989). Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153
(Fla. 1989). Such an award need not be limited to securing accrued alimony arrearages, but the
court may use the award "to protect the financial well-being of the obligee" as an integral part
of the average equitable distribution and support scheme. Id. at 1153-54.
141. Marston, 484 So. 2d at 34.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal has applied similar logic in other cases. Cf.
Andrews v. Andrews, 479 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (award of greater than 50% of
marital assets justified because award allowed husband to retain possession of business and
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alimony award ameliorated any disparity in the property awards. 14'
According to the court, the periodic alimony and the assets awarded
would maintain the wife's standard of living; therefore, the trial court
146
did not err in its award.
Because the trial court assigned no value to the wife's contribution
and furnished no rationale for its award, the appellate court in Marston
could only speculate as to why the trial court awarded the wife less
than half of the marital assets. Underlying the trial court's decision
was a judgment that the homemaker role is less valuable than the
wage-earner role. The decision punished the wife for assuming the
traditional role despite the fact that both parties agreed to this role
for the wife. Upon dissolution the trial court should have respected
that agreement rather than ignored it.
The appellate court affirmed, in part, because the alimony award
combined with the equitable distribution award enabled the wife to
maintain her standard of living. 147 In effect the court treated equitable
distribution as little more than an alternative form of alimony. 14 Pure
equitable distribution, however, requires courts to determine initially
what percentage of the marital assets the wife has earned by her
contributions. A court only then should ask whether the wife needs
an additional award of property that an equitable distribution or
alimony award cannot meet.
Moreover, the equitable distribution and alimony awards may not
have met the wife's needs in the Marston case. The wife never worked
outside the home during the marriage and did not have a college

ensured that his earning ability would remain undisturbed); Condren v. Condren, 475 So. 2d
268, 269 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (granting husband 70% of the marital assets and 58% of the
marital income because the assets were husband's "sole means of producing income").
145. Marston, 484 So. 2d at 34. Under the statute the court could have approached this
issue differently. The statute expressly authorizes courts to make an equitable distribution
award without regard to an alimony award. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (1989).
146. Marston, 384 So. 2d at 34-35.
147. Id.; see also Barry v. Barry, 511 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987); DiPrima v.
DiPrima, 435 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983). Courts appear reluctant to overturn an equitable
distribution unless the wife will be unable to maintain her predivorce standard of living with
the property and alimony awarded. See, e.g., Berger v. Berger, 464 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1985) (trial court should consider standard of living enjoyed during marriage).
148. This problem originated from the Canakariscourt's use of the alimony statute as its
statutory authorization for equitable distribution. Reliance on the alimony statute to justify
equitable distribution awards caused courts to view equitable distribution as a means of providing
support, instead of compensation for marital efforts. The new equitable distribution statute may
remedy this situation because it contains more factors relating to contribution. See FLA. STAT.
§ 61.08 (1989).
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degree or marketable skills. 149 The total award left her completely
dependent on alimony for support. Her financial status was precarious
because in Florida alimony terminates at the death of the husband. 15°
Although a $250,000 insurance policy secured the alimony award, the
face value reduced to $100,000 when the wife reached fifty. If the
husband died after the wife reached the age fifty, the wife would have
only $100,000 to provide for her old age.
The wife also would have to pay expenses out of her alimony
award, including health insurance, home and car repairs, property
taxes, and income taxes, thereby significantly reducing her disposable
income. 151 Income taxes alone would reduce the annual $42,000 award
to almost $30,000. 1152 Additionally, because the $6000 annual child support also was likely to prove inadequate, the wife may have been
forced to make up the shortfall out of monies intended to provide for
her own support.
If the court assumed the wife would remarry and thus be well
provided for, the court's assumption was unfounded. Thirty-three percent of all divorced women never remarry. 10 After women reach the
age of thirty, their remarriage rate begins to decline.' M Thus, Ms.
Marston, at age thirty-seven when she divorced her husband, likely
was never to remarry.
Meanwhile, the husband retained income totaling almost $200,000
after netting his tax deductible alimony payments from his gross income.cs Two hundred thousand dollars was seventy-nine percent of
the husband's gross income., 6 The assets the husband received had
growth potential,157 and at age forty his earning potential was likely
to increase.cs The husband's income and assets would therefore increase while the wife's income remained fixed. Moreover, the husband

149. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 4, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410). A divorced
woman interviewed in New York summed her employment opportunities by stating: "I'm capable,
but I'm not capable of earning money. I never developed those skills that you get paid for."
See Bouton, supra note 105, at 36.
150. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d at 342 (Fla. 1973).
151. See Appellants Reply Brief at 1-2, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
152. I.R.C. § 1(c) (1986).
153. T. ARENDELL, supra note 39, at x.
154. Nat'l Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT 5 (Supp. Sept. 12, 1980). In 1985 only 3% of divorced women between the ages of 45
and 64 remarried, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at D2, col. 2.
155. Marston, 484 So. 2d at 33.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 33-34.
158. See id.
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lived in an unmortgaged condominium. 159 Undoubtedly, the courtcreated economic disparity left the wife feeling abused. 16°
In making its award, the Marston court should have considered
the partnership concepts underlying equitable distribution. The wife's
contribution to the accumulation of the marital assets admittedly were
difficult to quantify, but the court should have presumed that the
couple intended to divide the property equally upon dissolution. The
161
parties themselves had already made that agreement.
The partnership approach is not inflexible. A court still can use
equitable principles in dividing marital property when the nature of
the assets prevents an equal allocation. For instance, the husband in
Marston argued that awarding the wife interest in his partnerships
would not benefit her because, as a minority shareholder, she could
not force dividend payments. 162 When marital assets have value only
if retained by a particular spouse, the court can require that spouse
to buy out the other spouse's one-half interest.'r' In Marston the trial
court could have required the husband to reimburse the wife for her
interest over a number of years at a normal interest rate to prevent
any negative impact on the husband's liquidity.
Tax laws would soften the effect of these payments on the husband.
Under the Internal Revenue Code the payments for the wife's half
interest in his partnerships would be classified as deductible alimony,
unless otherwise designated, reducing their cost to the husband by
roughly one-third.- Moreover, the court allowed the husband to keep
most of the liquid assets.'6 An award of these assets to the wife at
M

159. Appellant's Initial Brief at 10, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
160. One recently divorced woman said, "[M)y husband is going to get richer and richer,
and I'm going to get poorer and poorer. . . I feel as if I've been robbed of my own money. I
didn't gamble it away. I got married." Bouton, supra note 105, at 36.
161. Appellant's Initial Brief at 7, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
162. Appellee's Answer Brief at 10, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
163. See, e.g., Angle v. Angle, 506 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987) (while the court
found that partnership statutes precluded using partnership property to satisfy equitable distribution award, the court also found that the trial court should have required the husband to
satisfy the wife's one-half interest in cash payments).
164. See I.R.C. §§ 1(c), 71, 215 (1986) (payor spouse may deduct payments under § 215,
provided they meet the requirements of § 71 to qualify as alimony, i.e., the payments were
received under a decree of divorce, the payments were not specifically designated as not qualifying for the deduction, the spouses are not members of the same household, and the payor
spouse has no liability to continue the payment after the payee spouse's death. Because taxable
income greater than $17,850 is taxed at a marginal rate of 28%, every dollar paid out reduces
the payor spouse's tax burden by twenty-eight cents. Taxable income below $17,850 is taxed
at a marginal rate of 15%, reducing the benefit of the deduction).
165. See Marston, 484 So. 2d at 33 (the husband received 83% of the marital assets while
the wife received only 17% of the marital assets).
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least would have narrowed the financial disparity between the parties
after the divorce by allowing the wife to own income-producing prop1
erty.
The Marston court's award is unsupportable. The award failed to
compensate the spouses equally for the roles they adopted during the
marriage: husband as breadwinner and investor and wife as homemaker and mother. While the roles were different, both parties contributed significantly to their nineteen-year marriage. The husband
and the wife fully intended the roles to vest them with equal rights
to the marital property.
The court in its award also failed to consider the resulting disparity
between the parties' postdivorce economic circumstances. The court
treated the wife as the husband's former employee, entitled only to
a pension upon dissolution, instead of the husband's equal partner,
entitled to an equal share of the profits. If Florida intends to
strengthen marriage as an institution, it should not allow courts to
hold wives' marital efforts in such low esteem.
E.

Need as an Appropriate Considerationin
Equitable DistributionAwards

If a presumption of equal division solves the pervasive problem of
courts undervaluing wives' contributions, a question remains concerning what role property distribution should play in solving wives' future
economic needs. A court strictly construing partnership theory might
reason, 'Partnership involves equal rights and obligations in a dissolution. Equal rights requires that the wife receive half the marital property. Equal obligations requires that the wife furnish her own support
after divorce."
The property division in Woodard v. Woodard167 demonstrates such
an approach. In Woodard the couple divorced after thirty-four years
of marriage. 1' The trial court awarded each spouse an equal share of
the major marital asset, a lease producing $2,444 in monthly income.169
The trial court also awarded the wife the marital home, in which the
parties had an equity of $72,000, and permanent periodic alimony of
$600 per month. 70 The trial court's award left the husband with only

166.
Brief at
167.
168.
169.
170.

For a listing of all the assets awarded to the husband and wife, see Appellant's Initial
9, Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (No. 84-2410).
477 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985).
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
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$622 in net monthly income. 171 The trial court must have recognized
that neither party could maintain the marital standard of living based
solely upon the income from the marital assets and concluded that,
between the two spouses, the husband had the best economic potential
to make up the shortfall.
The appellate court termed the parties "true equal partners" and
reversed the wife's award of both the marital home and the permanent
periodic alimony.172 The court remanded the case to the trial court for
an equal division of the marital assets. 1 3 In reversing the trial court,
the appellate court held that no factor justified the disproportionate
award. 74
The trial court's award clearly was inequitable. By leaving the
husband with $622 in monthly income and awarding the wife $1822 in
monthly income and the marital home, the court left the husband "out
in the cold." As the appellate court noted, the trial court could not
justify the disparate treatment on age or health distinctions because
both the husband and the wife had reached their early fifties and both
had minor physical ailments.Y5 The appellate court, however, overlooked differences in work experience between the spouses. While the
disparity in work experience was not as stark as that in Marston,76
it did justify a larger equitable distribution to the wife than to the
husband.The husband had some college education and had worked throughout the marriage, first as an airplane company manager and then as
manager of the couple's tire business. 17 At the time of the divorce,
he continued to service the couple's lease on their tire business. 179 He
also owned a real estate license.'11 Although he had never used his
real estate license, he possessed a marketable skill.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 632-33; see also Ente v. Ente, 442 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983) ("equal
division of assets equitable" as husband and wife were equal partners despite fact that husband
had earning ability in excess of $31,000 and wife was only a self-employed bookkeeper and in

school).
173. Woodard, 477 So. 2d at 632-34.
174. Id. at 633.
175. Id. at 632.
176. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
177. See Stelk v. Stelk, 442 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (award of marital home to
wife not an abuse of discretion because, although husband earned less than wife at time of
dissolution, his business abilities would allow him readily to make up the shortfall).
178. Woodard, 477 So. 2d at 632.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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The wife had no college education. She had some work experience
as a bank officer, but at the time of the divorce, she had not worked
in a bank in seven years.181 Like her husband, she had worked in the
couple's tire business before they had leased it, but had not worked
at any job during the two years prior to the divorce. 18
While the trial court's award might have been inequitable, the
implicit factual determination that the husband had the greater ability
to make up the shortfall was merited. The appellate court's reversal
left the wife with only a half interest in the marital home, worth
$36,000, $1,222 in monthly income, and a diminished earning ability
to provide her with support and future security.1 8 The husband received an equal amount of marital property and retained a greater
earning ability.18 4
The appellate court could have upheld the equitable distribution
of the marital home to the wife by acknowledging her greater need.
This award would have eliminated the wife's difficulty of finding comparable housing with her half of the proceeds from the sale of the
marital home. If the appellate court had used this approach, it also
could have reversed the award of permanent periodic alimony to accommodate the husband's interests. In pursuit of an unrealistic vision
of postdivorce equality, the Woodard court ignored the substantial
disparity in earning abilities between the husband and the wife and
thus disregarded the special needs of the wife.
The Woodard result is not a logical application of the partnership
theory. Courts should ensure that a spouse does not remain needy
while the other spouse lives in relative prosperity.,, Courts must look
beyond a rigid conception of equality to consider the voluntary, mutual
obligation to care for the other spouse that every person undertakes
when he or she marries. Enforcing these obligations requires the
courts to project the wive's postdivorce economic circumstances and
to determine whether the award of the marital property based on
their contributions will enable them to meet their future needs.
Since Canakaris courts have provided for wives' needs by using
equitable distribution. 16 One way courts have provided for wives'

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 632, 634.
184. See id. at 633-34.
185. See Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204 (noting Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1974)).
186. See, e.g., Decker v. Decker, 534 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988) (justification found
in wife's contributions and financial dependency); Black v. Black, 490 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

35

1022

FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 2

[Vol. 41

needs is to award them the marital home, often the only asset of
significant value. 187 If the couple jointly owns the marital home and
the court does not award the home to the wife outright, she may
become dispossessed because the home is subject to partition. 1' If she
is dispossessed, appreciating property values make it unlikely that
she will be able to obtain comparable housing. 189 Alternatively, courts
may award the wife exclusive possession of the home until the children
reach adulthood.' ° When the wife has no earning abilities, however,
a grant of exclusive possession merely postpones the above-mentioned
difficulties. 91 Additionally, if the home is jointly owned and is sold,

D.C.A. 1986) (awarding wife greater than 50% of the marital assets when wife substantially
disabled due to serious illness was "supported by logic and justification"); Sokol v. Sokol, 441
So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983) (award of marital home to wife justified in part by wife's
needs as the custodial parent); Vawter v. Vawter, 419 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) (award
to wife of marital home justified when husband's income twice that of the wife and wife used
marital home to produce her income); Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 396 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1981) (award justified both by wife's contributions and the fact that award necessary
to ensure wife's survival). Courts also have recognized that when the wife's needs justify a
disparate award, the court can consider the husband's nonmarital assets in awarding the wife
greater than 50% of the marital assets. See, e.g., Haas v. Haas, 468 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1985).
187. See Thomas v. Thomas, 418 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982); Vanderslice, 396 So.
2d at 1185. See generally L. WEITZmAN, supra note 17, at 61-62 (home is the major asset for
about half of divorcing couples).
188. FLA. STAT. §§ 64.011-.0911 (1989). Consider the plight this situation created for the
fifty-nine-year-old wife in Jones v. Jones, 527 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988). She was not
employed outside the home. Id. at 244. While she received half of the proceeds from the sale
of the marital home, her only other income was $1000 in permanent periodic alimony. Id. Her
former husband was 72 years old, see id. at 244; and alimony would cease at his death. See First
Nat'1 Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973). Clearly, if the husband predeceased the wife,
the proceeds from her one-half interest in the marital home would not ensure her economic
survival. A better alternative would have been to award the marital home to the wife and the
other assets to the husband. Thus, an award of the marital home is hardly a windfall to the wife.
189. See Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
190. See Bullard v. Bullard, 413 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982).
191. See Klein v. Klein, 413 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982); see also Colucci v.
Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980) (judicial notice taken that job market poor
for middle-aged women; if husband were to die after children reached majority, absent outright
award of marital home, wife would be left in disastrous circumstances). Contra Safferstone v.
Safferstone, 501 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (in light of ample periodic alimony award,
court abused discretion in awarding wife marital home outright instead of awarding only exclusive
possession); Mundy v. Mundy, 498 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986) (not an abuse of discretion
to fall to give wife award of marital home, despite fact that husband made $39,000 per year
and had retirement fund, when wife awarded $600 a month periodic alimony and given exclusive
possession of marital home until daughter finished high school).
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each spouse will have to pay a capital gains tax at the time of sale. 19
Awarding the home to the wife prevents her from having to pay the
capital gains tax.
If the wife has no significant earning potential, the court should
award her the home outright instead of awarding her permanent exclusive possession.193 Permanent exclusive possession may be an inadequate remedy because the security it provides often is dependent
on the continued payment of periodic alimony. 194 An outright award
of the marital home gives the wife the additional security of the home's

equity.
Another approach to using equitable distribution to provide for a
wife's needs is to satisfy future child support and permanent alimony
awards out of the husband's share of the marital assets, even if it
requires awarding the wife more than half of the marital assets. 195
192. I.R.C. § 1001 (1986).
193. See Thomas v. Thomas, 418 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982); Klein, 413 So. 2d at
1297; UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307(a)(4), alt. B, 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987) (making
the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein to the custodial parent
an express consideration in disposing of marital property). L. WETzl'AN, supra note 17, at
341 (awarding wife marital home outright is superior to forcing sale of home and splitting sale
proceeds between the husband and wife because selling home removes financial "cushion" that
home provides). But cf. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 505 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) (when
wife never employed in twenty-eight-year marriage, court's failure to award marital home
outright to wife and instead awarding her only permanent exclusive possession affirmed, despite
fact that home located on parcel given to couple by wife's parents); Florence v. Florence, 400
So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (award to wife, earning $600 a month, of husband's interest
in marital home reversed and remanded for trial court to award wife exclusive possession of
the marital home despite fact that husband earned $1850 a month).
194. Klein, 413 So. 2d at 1299; cf. Robertson v. Robertson, 473 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1985) (outright award of marital home preferable to a periodic award because outright award
provided wife with some measure of future financial security). Contra Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So.
2d 373, 379 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983) (trial court abused discretion in giving wife marital home as
lump sum alimony, instead of awarding only exclusive possession, when periodic alimony to wife
and custody to husband roughly equalized the parties' economic situations despite the fact that
husband's leukemia jeopardized continued payment of alimony).
195. See, e.g., Robertson, 473 So. 2d at 24 (lump sum award of home instead of permanent
periodic alimony an innovative approach that provides for wife's and children's financial security);
cf. Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (lump sum alimony justified for
support purposes when unusual circumstances present); Davis v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 126 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1978) (because of the potential for disaster to the wife if her husband should predecease her, trial court should have reserved jurisdiction to make a lump sum alimony distribution
equivalent to the present value of future alimony payments in the event of her husband's death).
Contra Adamson v. Adamson, 458 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (trial court abused discretion
in awarding wife two-thirds of marital assets as partial satisfaction of periodic alimony); Culp
v. Culp, 413 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982) (use of lump sum alimony to satisfy child
support award against nonresident inappropriate because it held husband liable for support
before support obligation accrued).
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This approach is warranted not only when the husband has demonstrated a tendency to ignore his alimony obligations9 or is advanced
in age. 197 Rather, the court should employ equitable distribution
whenever sufficient assets are available to satisfy these awards at
their present value without jeopardizing the husband's need to retain
sufficient business assets to ensure his economic viability. 198

This approach would give the wife the greatest possible economic
independence'9 because her award would not be dependent on her
husband's future health, future financial ability to make the periodic
awards, or good faith.2°° Moreover, the approach would not significantly prejudice the husband's interests. If the wife receives the present value of the alimony award, the husband usually will pay the same
amount he would have paid under periodic alimony.
The principle argument against utilizing equitable distribution for
support is that, unlike child support and alimony, it cannot be modified. 201 Should the wife remarry, die, or win the Florida lottery, she,
or her estate, retains the property. In such situations the wife reaps
a windfall.
The windfall argument merits only limiting the circumstances in
which courts may employ equitable distribution to satisfy the wives'
future needs; the argument does not justify uniformly prohibiting this

196. See, e.g., Coil v. Coll, 507 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987); Vanderslice v.
Vanderslice, 396 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981); Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 300 So. 2d
694 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
197. Sandford v. Sandford, 508 So. 2d 516, 520 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987).
198. However, the court can make an equitable distribution award only from marital assets.
FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (1989).
199. Cf. Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (rejecting husband's argument that award to wife of husband's half-interest in marital home was inequitable
when husband retained tax-free pension untouched by trial court's award). This approach is
superior because it severs all bonds of a dissolved marriage. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491
So. 2d 265, 268 (Fla. 1986); see Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAME'rE L.
REV. 413, 425 (1976) (satisfying future support obligations removes marital ties and allows both
parties to go on with their lives); cf. Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980)
(award of lump sum alimony to terminate relationship between the parties justified when husband
had harassed the wife, broken into her home, and threatened her with a gun). This approach
will not always be possible. To the extent that insufficient assets make complete satisfaction
impossible, courts should utilize permanent periodic alimony and child support to make up the
shortfall.
200. For a discussion of the magnitude of the enforcement problem, see supranotes 34, 38.
201. See, e.g., Adamson v. Adamson, 458 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (trial court
cannot use lump sum alimony to provide support on a deferred basis because it is not modifiable;
but award could be sustained as an equitable distribution as long as it does not award the wife
a disproportionate amount of the marital assets).
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use of equitable distribution. For instance, a recently divorced woman
over forty is unlikely to remarry. 20 However, she often will have
significant needs. A traditional wife of a long marriage is unlikely to
attain an earning ability approaching self-sufficiency. 2° Awarding a
larger share of the marital assets to the wife of a long marriage, in
lieu of periodic support, is appropriate.
When mitigating circumstances are not present, the trial court at least should secure the
20 5
support award with life insurance.
Awarding the wife a larger share of the marital assets may prove
later to be inequitable due to changed circumstances. This inequity
will occur far less frequently than the inequities occurring under current practice. Under current practice, the husband's unwillingness or
inability to pay a periodic obligation often renders such an award an
empty gesture. Denying the wife equitable distribution to satisfy financial needs places the economic burden on the party least able to bear
26
that burden. 0

VI.

BURDEN OF PROOF AS AN OBSTACLE TO PARTNERSHIP

Prior to the adoption of the equitable distribution statute, Florida

courts required wives to justify a request for the equitable distribution of marital assets.2 7 The wife had the burden of proof to dem-

202. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 413 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) (award of marital
residence to wife justified to ensure her survival).
205. See Soberman v. Soberman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 61.08(3) (1989).
206. In the past, courts have developed novel solutions to the problem of obtaining adequate
support for the wife. See Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1153 (principal amount of alimony not limited
to payment of accrued alimony arrearages, but rather court can use as overall equitable distribution and support schemes) (construing FLA. STAT. § 61.08(3) (1989) which allows trial courts
to order alimony obligor to purchase life insurance "to protect [the] award of alimony"); Cremeens
v. Cremeens, 412 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1981) (contingent remainder interest in installment
contracts a vested alimony right, which does not violate the prohibition against continuation of
alimony after obligor's death and serves to satisfy needs of wife if husband should predecease
her); Stith v. Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) (when husband's assets insufficient
to support equitable distribution award but wife's support a real concern, court granted the
wife adequate security against the husband's demise by awarding husband's life insurance policies
to the wife as lump sum alimony and labeling the premium payments periodic alimony). Because
dissolution courts are attempting to solve real problems, they must apply the law liberally to
attain the goal of providing for the wife's needs. Another possibility is for the legislature to
authorize courts to retain jurisdiction to make an equitable distribution from the husband's
estate should the husband predecease the wife.
207. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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onstrate her contribution to the marriage. 28 By requiring the wife to
demonstrate contribution without placing a corresponding burden on
the husband, Florida 20courts
continue to make title the arbiter of an
9
equitable distribution.

Requiring only wives to justify an equitable distribution discriminates against wives. One divorce lawyer called the wife's burden of
proof the equivalent of "pushing a snowball up a hill.

'210

Unlike the

husbands' tangible monetary contributions, wives' contributions generally are not neatly quantifiable.
If the wife satisfies the court that she has contributed to the marriage, she then must establish the value of her share of the marital
estate. The wife must prove the value of the marital estate, an expensive
and arduous process. With a sizable marital estate, valuation involves
hiring accountants, appraisers, tax and pension specialists, economists,
and an excellent lawyer.211 Because each party will receive an uncertain

share, equitable distribution encourages litigation and its attendant
costs. By increasing the costs of dissolution, equitable distribution
favors the husband, who usually possesses the greatest resources.
Conversely, the wife usually has few resources and often accepts an
unreasonably low settlement to avoid litigation. This phenomenon encourages the husband to threaten litigation making "starv[ing] her
212
out" an effective strategy.
A presumption of equal division would decrease the incentive to
litigate and increase the incentive to negotiate. 213 Consequently, the

208. See Canakaris,382 So. 2d at 1201.
209. Because the common law system is property oriented and title is prima facie evidence
of ownership, the wife must dispel this presumption of ownership. Thus, although the legal
maxim that "title is king" may be outmoded, it is still royalty in Florida.
210. Bouton, supra note 105, at 36 (quoting Louis I. Newman).
211. Id. Legal fees alone can run easily into the tens of thousands of dollars.
212. Id.
213. Krauskopf, supra note 17, at 165, 176-77 (1976); see also Hashimoto v. Hashimoto, 6
Haw. App. 424, _,
725 P.2d 520, 522 (1986) ("uniform starting points" needed to provide
some standard for appellate review because abuse of discretion standard of review makes the
individual result depend upon which trial judge hears a particular case); L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 17, at 64 (one effect of an equal division rule would be to facilitate private settlements
because attorney could predict court-ordered settlements); Comment, Equitable Distribution
vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 761 (1982) (presumption of equal division would insert element of certainty into system
and would decrease length and cost of process); cf. Rheinstein, supra note 199, at 431-35
(criticizing the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act for committing property distribution to judicial
discretion). But see Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution,26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (1981) (focus should be on the precise facts at hand, and a generalized standard will
obstruct equity).
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presumption would reduce attorneys' fees and court costs and would
save litigants' time.2 14 Additionally, a requirement that judges render
written factual findings would improve appellate review, thereby pro215
moting consistency.
Courts could interpret the equitable distribution statute to have
equalized the burden of proof by basing equitable distribution on both
spouses' contributions. This interpretation would place both parties
on an equal footing. Because courts still accord the husband's wageearner role greater value than the wife's homemaker role, this change
would have minimal practical effect. The presumption of equal division
would help prevent courts from undervaluing wives' contributions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The impetus for legislative reform in Florida2 16 arises from the
current judicial approach to the distribution of marital property. This
approach is analogous to the common law approach, which prohibited
courts from distributing property titled in the husband's name to the
wife. Under the common law approach, title was king. Before passage
of the equitable distribution statute, title may not have been king in
Florida, but courts still treated it like royalty.

Critics of a presumption do not understand that law, by definition, is a shorthand means of
dealing with a wide variety of circumstances. All areas of law experience problems with overinclusiveness and under-inclusiveness, and inaccuracy is not an excuse for avoiding fashioning
difficult value choices. Rather, it should be an argument for including as many relevant criteria
as possible in an equitable distribution statute.
214. Valuation discrepancies still would result in litigation, but a presumption of equality
undoubtedly would reduce costs significantly in many instances.
215. Currently, the Florida Supreme Court has not adopted any requirement that trial
courts make explicit findings of fact. One district court has questioned why equitable distribution
awards do not require explicit factual findings when such findings are required in other areas
of law. See Barrs v. Barrs, 505 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) (noting that administrative
law, workmen's compensation, and all federal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require clear factual findings); see also Danoff v. Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1987) (trial courts must make findings of fact justifying failure to award wife equitable
distribution). One alternative would be a statutory amendment to the Florida equitable distribution statute, requiring written findings. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(5)(g) (Supp. 1989)
("[T]he court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such
[requirement] may not be waived .... ").
216. Pressure for reform may be lessened by the fact that wives who are wealthy or well
educated before marriage are less likely to be hurt by the current approach to equitable distribution. They are thus less likely to object to the current approach and more likely to have a
written distribution agreement. Uneducated wives, and wives without property when they
entered the marriage, expect less and are not as likely to bargain for an agreement. Because
such wives have little political power, little impetus exists to change the system. See Kuher,
supra note 25, at 42.
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While courts no longer are bound strictly by the common law
constraints, vestiges of common law philosophy remain. The Canakaris
decision imposed on the wife the burden of proof to demonstrate both
the justification for a distribution of marital assets and the ability of
the husband to comply with such an award. 217 Essentially, this approach tells the wife: "You don't own it unless you can prove it." The
wife's burden of proof is sufficiently analogous to the common law
approach to question the judiciary's commitment to the partnership
principle of marriage.
Equitable distribution, a hybrid of community property and common law concepts, fully recognizes a partnership theory that values
both tangible and intangible contributions to marital wealth. Florida
case law, however, reveals that equitable distribution awards often are
unequal because the court awards the husband the majority of the
income-producing assets. 21 Courts do not agree that the homemaking
role earns the wife an equal share of the marital assets. 219 Judicial
decisions equally dividing marital assets are extremely rare.220
Unequal awards of marital property are a product of almost unbounded trial court discretion. Trial judges are free to impose their
own values and have done so in a gender-biased fashion. Only if an
appellate court determines that the trial court abused its discretion
can it overturn the trial court's decision. Such a finding is rare. The
equitable distribution statute, despite the mandate of an equitable
distribution and the criteria allowing courts to equally value a traditional wife's contributions, is not likely to remedy the problem of
gender bias in property awards. Florida courts' property distributions
undervalue the contribution of the wife, and the statute hardly will
alter gender-biased judicial attitudes.
Unequal awards are unfair because married couples often agree
explicitly or implicitly to share the marital assets equally. A statutory
presumption of equal division should recognize these unwritten agreements. Adopting this value choice in a revised statute would ensure
enforcement.
Presuming equal division, courts would have only to characterize
and quantify the marital assets and then divide them equally. This
approach would greatly reduce the attendant costs associated with
judicial discretion because courts would have a clear standard to apply.

217.
218.
219.
220.

Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Reducing the costs of equitable distribution would promote equity by
reducing the advantage the wealthier spouse gains from forcing litigation.
Equity requires that judges retain a measure of flexibility to respond appropriately to individual circumstances. Discretion should
enter in the distribution decision only under unusual circumstances.
Contribution is difficult to quantify, and proof of contribution encourages litigation. Parties can prove need more readily, and judges should
retain discretion to consider either spouse's individual needs. Whether
the need is the wife's need to retain the marital home for herself and
the children or the husband's need to retain business assets to ensure
his economic viability, evidence of need should be admissible to rebut
the presumption of equal division.3 1
While mathematical precision often may be unattainable, a fairer
system of property division is possible. A presumption of equal division
and a requirement that awards deviating from an equal division be
justified by factual findings are means for providing a fairer system
of property division. Furthermore, a presumption of equal division
would strongly support the idea that marriage is an equal economic
partnership. A court would presume neither spouse's marital contributions to be superior; both parties would be entitled to an equal share
in the marital assets. The goal is to approximate real economic equality
upon divorce by acknowledging the interdependence of the marital
roles.
The disparate results reached by Florida courts defy the most basic
of all legal principles: judges dealing with similar cases should reach
the same result. A statutory presumption of equal division is necessary
to rectify the inequalities and inequities found in current equitable
distribution awards. Until this statutory deficiency is corrected, the
fairness the new statute promises remains illusory.

221. Courts should not permit the husband to utilize the character of the business assets
as an impenetrable defense to equitable distribution. For a discussion of such a defense, see
supra notes 142-46 (discussing Marston v. Marston, 484 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986)).
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